The UK Peace Dividend: Whence it Came, Where it Went. by Davis, Ian
  
The University of Bradford Institutional 
Repository 
http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk 
This work is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
refer to the repository record for this item and our Policy Document available from 
the repository home page for further information. 
 
 
Author(s): Davis, I. 
Title: The UK Peace Dividend: Whence it Came, Where it Went. 
Publication year: 1996 
Series title: Peace Studies Papers: Third series. 
Publisher: University of Bradford. Department of Peace Studies. 
Publisher’s site: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/publications/ 
Citation:Davis, I. (1996) UK Peace Dividend: Whence it Came, Where it Went. 
Peace Studies Papers: Third series. Bradford: University of Bradford. Department 
of Peace Studies. 
Copyright statement: © 1996 University of Bradford. Reproduced by 
permission from the copyright holder. 
PEACE STUDIES PAPERS THIRD SERIES
The UK Peace Dividend:




When disarmament got seriously under way after the end of the Cold War there was much
hope for a 'peace dividend' in Europe, of savings from military expenditures that could be used
to the benefit of domestic economies. In the UK in particular, there was considerable
speculation about the economic implications of major cuts in military spending, and several
studies suggested that with sensible adjustment policies such reductions would provide an
opportunity for improved economic performance. A macro-economic simulation carried out
by Barker, Dunne and Smith, for example, suggested that a halving of the UK's military
expenditure by the year 2000 would lead to a reduction in unemployment of 0.52 million and a
net increase of almost 2% of GDP (provided that the expenditure was reallocated to other
categories of government current and capital expenditure).2 Similarly, an earlier report by
Christopher Johnson, Chief Economic Adviser, Lloyds Bank, concluded that the British
economy would benefit from cuts in defence spending through:
lower public expenditure, the release of scarce manpower, the switch of high technology manufacturing
capacity into civilian production. and a reduction of the military balance of payments deficit. 3
Six years after the end of the Cold War (and ten years after military expenditure peaked in the
UK), a critical assessment of what has actually happened to the savings in military expenditure
seems overdue, particularly as none of the competing claims seem to have been fulfilled and
there is a general feeling that, in the UK at least, there has been no peace divided.4 This paper
is a contribution to the growing debate on whether the opportunities presented by the changed
strategic climate in Europe have been fully utilised. The general theoretical and conceptual
issues surrounding the 'peace dividend' are discussed in Section 2. The paper then examines
the economic consequences of reductions in UK military expenditures (in the period from
1985-86 to 1994-95): in Section 3 the extent of the cuts in the total defence budget are
considered, while Section 4 examines the shifts in expenditure categories within the budget.
Consideration is also given to some of the costs and benefits of the military drawdown,
including the impact on procurement, employment and equipment holdings. In Section 5, the
paper provides a short quantitative analysis of which categories of government expenditure
have increased and/or decreased during this period, although there is little evidence to suggest
a direct correlation between the limited reductions in the defence budget and the greater
increases in some of the other categories of public expenditure. This is followed in Section 6
by a brief consideration of the opportunities for restructuring the economy in Northern Ireland
as a result of the potential demilitarisation in the Province (where, for a short time at least, and
in stark contrast to the situation in mainland Britain, the peace dividend was recycled in the
economy). In Section 7, the paper reviews the extent to which financial support has been
provided to assist industrial conversion in the UK. Finally, drawing on the preceding analysis,
the paper reaches some conclusions as to why a significant 'resource dividend' appears to have
resulted in a partial 'welfare dividend', but not a 'product dividend'.
The idea that it is possible to obtain a so-called peace dividend from a fall in military
expenditures is a popular notion, yet rarely is the process well defined. A recent review by the
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNlDIR) concluded that disarmament is
best seen as an investment process, with short-term costs (as resources are displaced) but
long-term benefits (as the resources are allocated to alternative uses).5 The UNIDIR study
also suggests that if there are alternative sources of demand available and if the economy
adjusts faster, then the costs will be smaller and the benefits larger. This macroeconomic
verdict is also reflected in the work of the economist, Steve Chan, who suggests that there are
at least two, and possibly three, steps in the process of realising the peace dividend.6 Step one
involves the creation of a resource dividend, through substantial cuts in military expenditure,
which in turn can be applied to promote greater production efficiency. This product dividend
is step two. The third step, a welfare dividend, results 'either directly from the transfer of
defence savings to increase public funding for social programmes, or indirectly from the
trickle-down effects of a healthier economy'J It is clear from this typology of meanings that
lower defence spending, while creating a resource dividend, does not automatically or even
inevitably result in a product or welfare dividend. As the authors of the UNIDIR study wrote,
it is not like shifting money from one pocket to another. This simplistic view ignores the fact
that lower defence spending 'entails a fundamental reallocation of resources in the economy
with real adjustments to be made in employment patterns, capital utilisation, in the size and
structure of industries and in land use'. 8 While one of the long-term economic effects of
defence cutbacks may be to produce an indirect welfare dividend, the socioeconomic
disruption caused by lower military expenditure is likely to cause a welfare deficit in the short-
term (in the absence of compensatory social spending). Moreover, the prospects for a product
dividend, are likely to be even more dependent on how defence savings are redeployed and
how efficiently they are put to use in the economy. Chan suggests that national economic
structures are also important:
How quickly and how large a product dividend can be realised from defence reductions also depends on
the nature of existing economic structure, the extent to which defence industries are already involved in
civilian production, and the efficiency with which a country is likely to further convert military resources
into civilian production.9
These observations on the three-step approach to the peace dividend lead Chan to a number
of other broad assumptions. The most important (within the context of a UK case study) are
summarised as follows. First, and most obviously, the resource dividend is reliant on
significant defence cuts. Second, the product and, to a lesser extent, the welfare dividend
appear to be dependent on overall government spending remaining constant or even rising
during periods of military retrenchment. Third, there is no guarantee that this is how the
resource dividend will be utili sed. It can also be used to cut business taxes, reduce budget
deficits (which may allow interest rates to be lower and investment higher) or raise private
consumption (through reduced personal taxation). These alternative choices all have different
economic impacts, both beneficial and negative, although the implicit assumption is that the
end result is a much more diluted peace dividend with greater displacement costs. This leads
on to the fuurth assumption, that defence cuts will inevitably produce displacements in the
economy at the micro economic level, and the resulting 'burden of adjustment' will be
distributed unevenly across different regions, industries and occupations. As Chan concludes,
this also implies 'that that those who are asked to bear most of this adjustment burden may not
be the same people who stand to benefit most from the peace dividend'.l0 Fifth, the
distribution of this burden will depend on which categories of defence spending bear the brunt
of the budgetary cuts. The choices made, for example, between reducing personnel costs,
closing military bases and cutting weapons procurement, will determine who shoulders the
principal burden of adjusting to a smaller defence budget. Finally, as a corollary of the
previous assumptions, allocation of the resource dividend (and the precise location of defence
cuts) will involve distributive and ideological struggles among rival political, military and
domestic interest groups. These assumptions are now put to the test, starting with an
evaluation of the cuts in the aggregate UK defence budget.
The reductions in the UK defence budget since the end of the Cold War can be interpreted in
a number of ways and a useful starting point is the decision-making context. In power for
more than sixteen years, the Conservative Government's response to the transformation in
European security is represented by Options for Changell (supplemented later by the Front
Line First studyI2). The Options for Change process started in late 1989 and was conducted in
secret within various government ministries and coordinated in the MoD. A drip feed of
interim announcements culminated in the defence White Paper in July 1991 (known as
'Options for Change') which sought to maintain most of the UK's former defence capabilities
while simultaneously making reductions in armed forces and overall defence expenditure. The
Government also emphasised the need to maintain a robust defence capability as insurance
against the unexpected, and the cuts were to be compensated by improvements in
equipment.13 This strategy was thought to be politically acceptable but rather surprisingly
elicited a hostile reaction from many Conservative and Opposition ~;Ps - resulting in some of
the planned Army regiment amalgamations being rescinded.
Despite the furious political storm over disbanded regiments, there was no proper public
discussion of these issues. 14 Wi-tilethe Government insist that the changes are 'strategy-led and
resource-disciplined'15 almost all the opposition parties have condemned Options for Change
as inadequate and 'treasury-driven'.16 Moreover, the demand for a proper defence review is
increasingly coming from those who think that the changes have gone too far (whereas
initially the demand came from those who thought that they did not go far enough), including
a number of prominent politicians on the Government benches, the all-party House of
Commons defence committee and defence industry representatives. Indeed, the House of
Table I:UK Government Defence Expenditure 1978-79 to 1996-97
(A) in real termsCI) and (B) as a percentage of GDP
1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
(A) £bn 21.1 22.4 23.0 23.5 25.1 25.8 27.1 26.9 26.4 25.8
(B) % 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.1 4.8 4.4
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
(A) £bn 24.5 24.8 24.1 23.9 23.6 22.7 21.3 19.9 19.6
(B) % 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.9
Notes: (1) Cash figures adjusted to 1992-93 price levels by excluding the effect of general inflation
(2) The figures for 1990-91 and 1991-92 are net of other govermnents' contributions to the cost of the
Gulf conflict
Sources: 1978-79 to 1993-94 - Public Expenditure: Statistical Supplement to the Financial Statement and
Budget Report 1994-95, em 2519, HM Treasury February 1994, Table 1.3.
1994-95 - MoD, UK Defence Statistics 1994, London: HMSO, Table 1.2
1995-96 and 1996-97 - Authors' calculations based on predicted reductions in real terms of 6.5% and
1.5% respectively, quoted in Financial Times on 30 November 1994.
Commons Defence Committee warned that further cuts in Britain's defence budget would
result in the armed forces' capabilities falling 'below the minimum level necessary for the
security of the UK'. 17
Given this cautious policy context, the actual reductions in defence expenditure initially seem
quite impressive, particularly when measured against the peak years of defence spending in the
mid 1980s. As Table I shows, this approach can reveal quite significant reductions in defence
expenditure, especially as the defence budget has not carried the net additional costs of either
the Gulf War or the Bosnian peacekeeping operations.18 Having peaked in 1984-85 at £27.1
billion (at constant 1992-93 prices), the defence budget has tended to fall at about 1% or 2%
per annum in real terms since then. The estimated defence budget for 1994-95 (at constant
1992-93 prices) is £21.3 billion,19 and so the defence budget has shrunk by roughly £5.8
billion (or 21%) since the peak year. According to government estimates, defence spending is
expected to fall by a further 14% in real terms between 1992-93 and 1996-97. Measured as a
percentage ofGDP, defence expenditure has been reduced from 5.3% in 1984-85 to 3.7% in
1993-94 (and is projected to fall to 2.8% ofGDP by 1997-98).
If, however, the reductions in defence expenditure are measured against defence budgets over
the period of the Cold War, the recent reductions are much less impressive. The historic trend
of UK defence spending since the mid 1950s has been to remain roughly constant in real
terms, while falling gradually as a percentage of GDP. The UK will still be spending more in
1994-95, for example, than in 1978-79 when the Cold War conflict was about to intensify
again.20 One should be cautious, therefore, about using 1984-85 as a base year for making a
trend analysis of UK defence spending. Moreover, if we take the UK's average annual
expenditure during the Cold War as the base line, a rather different picture emerges. As shown
by Table II, UK defence spending during the Cold War (1947-48 to 1989-90) totalled
approximately £890 billion at 1992-93 prices, or an average of £20.7 billion per annum. Even
after ten years of decline, the 1994-95 defence budget at £21.3 billion (in 1992-93 prices) not
only remains greater than the average annual Cold War defence budget, but also exceeds in
real terms the annual budget for 29 out of the 43 years of the conflict. Thus, given the current
secure West European military environment and the disarmament measures introduced in the
East, it is difficult not to conclude that the UK reductions in defence spending since 1984-85
remain modest.
Given these different interpretations of the statistical evidence, how do we set about
measuring the resource dividend? This entirely depends on your choice of what economists
call the 'counterfactual'. Put simply, this means an assumed turning point which allows a
comparison to be made between recent spending levels and what would have happened in the
absence of a commitment to check spending. The core cDunterfactual question in this case,
therefore, is how much would Britain be spending now, if the Cold War had continued for
another decade. Many analysts would argue that there has been a long term trend of rising
defence spending21 which was only reversed in 1984-85. Hence, given this point as the
assumed counterfactual, the cumulative annual savings on the defence budget between 1985-
86 and 1994-95 amount to an 'optimum' resource dividend of £29.1 billion (see Table X).22
Measured in this way, the implication is that the resource dividend will continue to grow in
future years - or there will be a second resource dividend - provided the defence budget
remains below the 1984-85 ceiling (although at some later point, presumably a revised
counterfactual should be chosen). While most commentators suggest that the downward trend
Table II: UK Government Defence Expenditure During the Cold War
1947-48 to 1989-90 in real terms(l)
(£ bn)
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58
16.4 13.8 13.3 13.6 17.9 21.2 20.0 20.7 19.4 19.9 18.0
1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69
17.8 17.7 18.8 19.2 19.6 19.4 19.7 20.3 20.0 20.8 19.6
1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80
18.4 19.3 20.0 20.2 21.2 21.2 21.7 22.1 21.4 21.1 22.4
1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1947-90
23.0 23.5 25.1 25.8 27.1 26.9 26.4 25.8 24.5 24.8 889.0
Note: (1) Cash figures adjusted to 1992-93 price levels
Sources: 1947-48 to 1977-78 - Malcolm Chalmers, Paying Jor Defence, Pluto 1985, graph on p193. 1984-85
prices aqjusted to 1992-93 prices with 59.1% inflator.
1978-79 to 1989-90 - Public Expenditure: Statistical Supplement to the Financial Statement and
Budget Report 1994-95, Cm 2519, HM Treasury February 1994, Table 1.3.
is set to continue, caution is needed when looking at government estimates on the future size
of the defence budget. Further reductions are being predicted on the basis of lower inflation
and pay costs, a receipt of £500 million pounds in respect of the sale of Service married
quarters23 and (from 1996-97 onwards) 'substantial savings' from the Defence Costs Study.24
This latter Study, more commonly known as Front Line First, was launched in December
1993 to meet a Treasury demand for cuts of at least £750 million a year from 1996-97. It is to
be achieved by streamlining administration and support services on a tri-service basis where
possible, and by 'contracting out' support services, such as aircraft maintenance.
While the privatisation of support services and other administrative changes will undoubtedly
lead to reductions in the overall defence budget, the underlying trend as regards the combat
arm of the budget (namely equipment procurement expenditure and expenditure on personnel
of the Armed Forces) is less easy to discern. On the one hand, official forecasts suggest that
the procurement budget will stabilise at around £9 billion or decrease marginally in the latter
part of the 1990s. On the other hand, it may be difficult (for a number of reasons discussed
below) for the government to keep within equipment plannirtg targets. In addition to
aggregate spending levels, therefore, it is important to consider the changing composition of
the defence budget and in particular the growing emphasis on 'Front Line' capabilities. It is to
the composition of the defence budget that we now turn our attention.
The UK defence budget is divided into three principal headings: expenditure on personnel,
expenditure on equipment and other expenditure. Estimated expenditure for these categories
in 1994-95 current prices are £9,435 million, £8,590 million and £4,747 million respectively.
As Table III shows, all three headings show real reductions in expenditure over the period
between 1985-86 and 1994-95, although rather surprisingly in the light afFront Line First, the
largest reduction of 35% is recorded for equipment expenditure, with personnel and other
expenditure showing more modest reductions of 9% and 13% respectively. Again, however,
these initial findings only provide a partial picture, and it is necessary to look at each
individual heading in closer detail to reveal some of the longer-term trends.
Table ill: Principal Headings of the UK Defence Budget (at constant 1992-93 prices)
£ million
1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1988-89 1989-90 1990.91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95
(1) (1) Estimates (2)
Expenditure on 11,223 9,799 9,681 9,816 9,926 10,052 10,419 10,504 9,539 8,829
personnel
% shaI"e of the 47.3 40.7 35.6 39.7 39.0 39.5 40.5 44.2 42.0 41.4
total expenditure
- oflbe Armed Forces 24.4 22.0 19.6 22.5 21.8 21.6 22.4 23.7 29.5 29.0
- oflbe retired Armed
Forces 4.8 4.5 5.0 5.6 5.8 6.3 6.6 8.2 n/a n/a
- of civilian staff 1R..I .14.2 .1.1.0 11.6 .1.1.4 1.1.6 .I J.5 .12.3 .12.5 .12.4
Expenditure on 7,948 10,506 12,434 10,419 10,462 10,082 10,234 8,711 8,796 8,037
equipment
% share of the 33.5 43.7 45.7 42.1 41.1 39.6 39.7 36.7 38.8 37.7
total expenditure
Other expenditure 4,542 3,744 5,115 4,490 5,048 5,303 5,108 4,547 4,362 4,441
% share oflbe 19.2 15.6 18.8 18.2 19.9 20.9 19.8 19.1 19.2 20.9
total expenditure
Total expenditure 23,713 24,049 27,230 24,725 25,436 25,437 25,761 23,762 22,697 21,307
Notes: (1) The figures for 1990-91 and 1991-92 include the cost of the Gulf conflict (in contrast to Table I)
(2) From 1993-94 the defence budget excludes pension payments to retired Service personnel and
figures from 1994-95 exclude provision for the Security and Intelligence Services
Source: MoD, UK Defence Statistics 1994, London: HMSO 1994, Table 1.2
1989/90 April 1993 Redundancy April 1994 Redundancy
1993/94 1994/95
Royal Navy 59,400 1,272 55,800 2,400
Army 34,600 6,460 123,000 7,015
Royal Air Force 80,900 968 75,700 2,200
Total Service Personnel 318,900 274,900 8,700 254,500 11,615
Total Civilian 171,916 124,500 2,639 121,600 3,400
Source: MoD, Departmental Report by the MoD: The Government's Expenditure Plans 1995/96 to 1997/98,
em 2801, London: HMSO, 1995, Table 7, p20.
While the percentage share of the total defence budget allocated to the Armed Forces (for
salaries, pensions and associated personnel expenditure) has increased from 24.6% in 1985-86
to 29% (or £6,607 million at current prices) in 1994-95, in real terms this part of the budget
has fallen by 8% over the same period. The main reason for this downward trend is the
reduction in Service personnel numbers,25 although the overall effect on the defence budget is
mitigated by redundancy and other demobilisation costS.26 The Options for Change review
prescribed a 20% reduction in the British Armed Forces, with the British Army bearing the
brunt of the cuts. Following further revisions under Front Line First the three services were
expected to number 231,500 on 1 April 1996 (from a baseline of 305,711 on 1 April 1990):
around 117,000 British Army; 48,000 Royal Navy; and 66,500 RAF. All three services are
achieving the reductions through reduced recruitment, natural wastage and redundancies. So
far, most of the redundancies (95% up to 1993) have been voluntary. Current force personnel
levels and recently announced redundancy figures are shown in Table IV.
The Reserve Forces have also suffered cutbacks. A review of the role and organisation of the
Territorial Army (TA) reserve force has been completed and the draft of a new Reserve
Forces Bill is expected to be introduced in 1995-96. The TA's mission is shifting from 'Cold
War mobilisation' to a wide ranging support role for the regular army. This will mean further
cuts in TA infantry units, but increases in certain logistical support units, particularly those
with specialist skills that are not cost effective to maintain on a large scale in the regular army.
From an establishment of 93,000 personnel in 1991 (although actual strength at the time was
only 75,000), the TA is expected to be reduced to 59,000 by April 1997. Finally, concern is
often expressed that the UK has a higher ratio of senior officers to troops than many other
countries, and that there may be too many senior officers holding non-combatant positions. 27
While Front Line First is likely to lead to a reduction in the number of non-combatant officers,
Table V shows that officer strength in the UK Armed Forces has so far been reduced less
proportionally than overall service personnel levels. In fact, between 1985 and 1992 the
number of senior Army officers (Lieutenant Colonel and above) actually increased. The
number of Major Generals and more senior ranks only started to fall significantly in 1992.
Year Major General Senior Officers Service RatioofMG Ratio of 0
(l Apr) or above Officers(l) (0) Personnel to 10,000 SP to SP
(MG) (SP)
1985 207 6,393 42,500 283,600 7.3 : I 1 : 6.7
1988 203 6,585 43,134 273,761 7.4 : 1 1 : 6.4
1991 204 6,771 42,850 255,215 8.0: 1 1 : 6.0
1994 180 6,014 37,487 217,001 8.3: 1 1 : 5.8
Change: -27 -379 -5,103 -66,599
Note: (1) Rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above (male only).
Sources: MoD News Release 181/93, 2 December 1993, Table 1; MoD, UK Defence Statistics 1993, London:
HMSO 1993, Tables 2.4 and 2.14; and MoD, UK Defence Statistics 1994, London: HMSO 1994, Table 2.8.
The civilian staff budget shows similar trends to that of the service personnel. While the
percentage share of the total defence budget allocated to civilian staff28 has increased from
11% in 1985-86 to 12.4% (or £2,828 million at current prices) in 1994-95, in real terms this
part of the budget has fallen by 11% over the same period. The inclusion from 1993-94 of
pension provision for currently serving civilian personnel has not been sufficient to
compensate for the downward trend caused by reductions ill civilian staff numbers - which
were planned to mirror the 20% reduction in the armed forces by 1996. Thus, civilian numbers
are expected to be reduced to 128,700 by April 1996, a reduction of 32,100 on the July 1990
figures. The number of redundancies is expected to be kept to a minimum, however, and there
have only been some 7,700 since April 1990. These continuing reductions come on top of a
longer term trend which has seen the proportion of civilian staff to the total size of the armed
forces fall from 88% in 1979 to 55% in 1994.29
UK defence procurement expenditure peaked in the mid-1980s, and has declined in real terms
since then by about 35%. Overall, the procurement strategy over recent years has been to
maintain R&D capabilities for new generations of equipment, with the emphasis on force
multiplication - smaller numbers of military platforms but increased capabilities through
enhanced communications and intelligence, which favours electronics-based equipment in
general. This emphasis on technological improvements for smaller forces is reflected in the
relative stability of defence R&D (which in 1992-93 began to rise as a proportion of the
equipment budget) in comparison to the fall in overall equipment expenditure, as shown in
Table VI. But given the history of technical problems and cost overruns on large military
equipment projects,30 the government's twin objectives of increased military capability
(through technological improvements) and lower equipment spending may be untenable on
both counts. It is particularly difficult to see how the government can keep within equipment
planning targets when most of the Cold War equipment programmes are continuing in
development and production31 - although there have been significant reductions in the
numbers of platforms ordered compared to original requirements.
These developments will have a crucial impact on future procurement spending. If the MoD
keeps to the general policy reflected in current and planned R&D expenditure, there is every
possibility that it will have to increase aerospace spending by up to 25% in real terms and it
will be hard to find compensatory cuts in other areas of the budget. 32The growth in spending
will be in the areas of aerospace and electronics - mainly for Eurofighter 2000, but also for a
range of guided missiles and other aerospace programmes, as well as communications and
command and control. As a result, it will be no surprise to see equipment expenditure rise in
real terms and the MoD will have difficulty in offsetting this through savings in personnel and
support services.
At around £9 billion per annum, or about 10% of overall manufacturing production, the
procurement budget still represents a large source of work for UK industries. However, the
Table VI: UK Government Spending on Defence R&D and Equipment 1975-76 to 1992-
93 in real terms
1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
Equipment (fm) 6,791 9,184 10,897 9,924 9,163 9,133 8,838 8,861 7,951
R&D (fm) 2,595 3,075 3,014 2,587 2,420 2,463 2,337 2,311 2,437
R&D as a proportion 38.2% 33.5% 27.6% 26.1% 26.4% 26.9% 26.4% 26.1% 30.6%
of equipment
Source: MoD, UK Defence Statistics 1992, London: HMSO 1992, Tables 1.2 and 1.4, with 1990-91 as
current year and deflator as given in Table 1.2.
Table VII: UK Defence Employment
(Thousands)
1985-86 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
Totals 625 545 515 425
Direct 345 285 275 230
Indirect 280 260 235 195
MoD Expenditure
Totals 515 420 400 340
Direct 285 220 215 185
Indirect 230 200 180 155
Exports
Totals 110 125 115 90
Direct 60 65 60 45
Indirect 50 60 55 45
MoD Equipment Expenditure
Totals 360 255 270 230
Direct 200 135 140 120
Indirect 160 120 130 110
MoD Non-Equipment Expenditure
Totals 155 165 125 110
Direct 85 85 75 65
Indirect 70 80 50 45
Sources: MoD UK Defencp. Statistics 1992, London: HMSO 1992; and MoD, UK Defence Statistics 1994,
London: HMSO 1994.
UK's industrial and technological base has been contracting for a number of years and as Table
VII shows over 200,000 defence related jobs (32% of the total) have been lost in the UK
since the mid 1980s. Similarly, 20,000 export-related jobs (18% of the total) have been lost
over the same period. Moreover, this decline in defence employment precedes the end of the
Cold War and reflects wider trends in the defence industry - such as national concentration33,
greater commercialisation and increased intemationalisation - as well as reductions in national
defence expenditure. Thus, caution is needed when making projections about employment.
Between 1989 and 1992, for example, there was a very steep level of job losses relative to the
overall reduction in defence spending. However, direct employment stabilised in 1992, before
experiencing another steep cut in 1993.
Without a supportive framework for conversion defence comparjes have predictably
responded to declining national procurement budgets through massive job losses and cutbacks
in capacity. Some companies have achieved notable success through diversification,34 but the
general trend has been one of rapid rationalisation with the prime contractors running down
and closing large sites. Generally, the leading companies have consolidated around defence
work and focused their efforts on expanding defence exports.
More UK-based jobs are likely to be lost in the future as the prime contractors attempt to
maximise profits by transferring routine production to low-paid and non-unionised workers
abroad. Within Europe, the Eurofighter 2000 project has already transferred aerospace
employment from Britain to Spain, and it seems likely that future programme;; will look to
South East Asia for the advantages of cheap labour. Based on current trends, therefore, all
that might remain in the way of defence employment in the UK by the end of the present
decade, is a much reduced core of specialist R&D and assembly workers. What is clear,
though, from the limited available evidence on the post-redundancy experience of displaced
defence workers, is that valuable manufacturing skills are not being retained in the economy.
According to a recent study of defence workers, of those who lost their jobs, 33% were
unemployed a year later, 34% had semi-skilled employment and 29% were in manufacturing
work.35
Significant savings in the defence budget are being made from the disposal of surplus
conventional weapons and equipment. 36Reductions in front-line equipment and stockholdings
under Options for Change, combined with the rationalisation of support functions, are
expected to give rise to 'exceptional disposal activity in the next few years'.37 The MoD
estimate that front line equipment will reduce by approximately 20% and stockholdings by 33-
50%. It might be assumed therefore that a quantitative assessment of surplus creation since
1984-85 might reveal a constant upward trend in disposal by sale of such equipment. The
available evidence suggests, however, that the underlying upward trend is dependent on
overseas sales of major capital weapons, particularly operational vessels and aircraft.38 The
disposal strategy to date has focused on exports, as opposed to the destruction or conversion
of surplus equipment (although much of this equipment is either dual-use or predominantly
civilian in nature, as opposed to operational weapon systems). In the future, however, an
increase in the export of operational equipment is expected because surpluses are now arising
out of the drawdown rather than as a result of the equipment reaching the end of its useful
operational life. To deal with this general increase in disposal activity, a central disposal
organisation was formed within the MoD in April 1990, and was granted Agency status (as
the Disposal Sales Agency) in October 1994.
The withdrawal from Germany represents the largest peacetime movement of British troops
and equipment in modem times. In addition to the withdrawal of around 27,000 troops,39 the
run-down of British forces in Germany includes the disposal of 2,900 tanks and armoured
vehicles, 15,200 trucks and landrovers, 1.6 million items of stores and spares, 20,000 tonnes
of ammunition and 54,000 square metres of accommodation. According to the National Audit
Office, the withdrawal process is 'in chaos' however.4o Equipment in good working order is
rusting in fields, records of potentially dangerous ammunition and detonators have gone
missing and vehicles are being cannibalised unnecessarily. The audit report concludes that the
projected savings of £177 million (including a sales target of surplus goods of £13.5 million)
will not be met. Net savings of £105 million are now expected.
In the quest for economies it is the support services that are bearing the brunt of the changes.
Training, distribution, transport, housing, spares and storage are increasingly being 'contracted
out' to private companies.41 As Table VIII shows, the Front Line First study is set to
exacerbate this trend, with an estimated net reduction of a further 18,700 support and
administrative jobs by the year 2000. It has already been announced, for example, that the
MoD's medical services are being reorganised on a tri-service basis with expected savings of
about £50 million a year.
Base closures and the rationalisation of the defence estate have been another significant source
of savings in the defence budget. In 1990 the MoD was thought to be using about 1.5% of the
UK land area (or 223,000 hectares worth about £1 billion), mainly for training, firing ranges
and airfields. Between 1980 and 1990 only about 5% (or 11,000 hectares) of this land was
disposed of 42 In the last three financial years some £250 million has been raised from the sale
of surplus property and further disposal activity is expected as the MoD continues to
rationalise its land holdings. The legacy of military pollution remains a problem, however, and
is likely to depress commercial values.43 Finally, in addition to the drawdown in Germany,
recent overseas base closures and rationalisations include the closure of a small Royal Navy
station in Bermuda, withdrawal of the infantry battalion from Gibraltar, the downgrading of
the British garrison in the Central American state of Belize (from an operational command to
a small training operation), and the withdrawal of 6,250 troops from Hong Kong. By the time
China assumes sovereignty over Hong Kong in July 1997 the remaining Gurkha battalion will
have also been withdrawn. 44
Table vm: Estimated Job Reductions Resulting from Front Line First by Year 2000
RN Army RAF Civilian Total
HQ Reductions 150 200 500 900 1,750
More Efficient Recruiting 600 900 2,200 3,700
Medical Support 250 250 250 270 1,020
Rationalisation of Spares Depots 800 300 ·2,150 3,100 6,350
Improvements in Info. Technology 20 300 100 430 850
Air Traffic Control 200 200
RationaIisation of Science & Technology 1,300 1,300
Other Civilianisation 1,500 1,500
Other Support Posts, incl Fire Services 80 250 600 1,100 2,030
Total 1,900 2,200 7,500 7,100 18,700
Source: MoD, rl'ont Line First - The Defence Costs Study, London: HMSO 1994, Table 2, p39.
Table IX: UK General Government Expenditure - Value and Percentage Difference (in
real terms) from Base Year, 1984-85
1938-89 1991-92 1994-95 1988-89 1991-92 1994-95
Defence (1) -2.6 -3.3 -6.2 -9.3 -11.8 -22.2
Social security 1.7 11.3 24.5 2.6 17.6 38.1
Health & personal sccial services 4.1 8.6 14.0 13.0 27.3 44.4
Education 2.6 5.1 8.0 9.8 19.3 30.3
Law, order & protective services 1.6 3.7 4.9 15.7 36.3 48.0
Housing -3.0 -1.1 -1.8 -41.7 -15.3 -25.0
Transport -1.4 0.7 1.0 -15.4 7.7 11.0
Trade, industry, energy
& employment -2.2 -4.0 -4.4 -17.2 -31.2 -34.4
Overseas services,
including aid (2) 0.3 0.6 1.0 ILl 22.2 37.0
Total government expenditure (3) 0.3 16.1 43.8 0.1 6.5 17.8
Notes: (1) Defence figures for 1991-92 are net of other governments' contributions to the cost of the Gulf
conflict.
(2) The modest increase in the overseas services budget (which includes overseas aid) has to be
considered in the light of the covert practice in the UK of linking aid to arnlS. Unlike some arms exporting
countries, the UK government claims that it has not established a specific aid budget to subsidise defence
sales. However, the recent disclosure that £1.3 billion of British defence contracts were linked with £234
million of British aid to the Pergau hydro-electric dam project in Malaysia, drew attention to the practice -
now thought to be widespread - of linking foreign aid with arms sales to developing countries.
(3) Excludes privatisation proceeds.
Source: Treasury, Public Expenditure: Statistical Supplement to the Financial Statement and Budget Report
1995-96, HM Treasury February 1995, Tables 1.3& 1.4.
Table X: Comparison of UK Privatisation Dividend and 'Optimum' Peace Dividend
£ bn (in real terms at 1993-94 prices)
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Total
Peace Dividend 0.1 0.7 1.3 2.6 2.3 3.2 3.3 4.3 5.1 6.2 29.1
Privatisation
Dividend 4.1 6.6 7.2 9.3 5.2 6.1 8.5 8.4 5.5 6.2 67.1
Source: Treasury, Public Expenditure: Statistical Supplement to the Financial Statement and Budget Report
1995-96, HM Treasury February 1995, Table 1.3.
Having discussed the composition of the defence budget and shown in some detail where the
adjustment burden has fallen, it is now time to turn our attention to the potential product and
welfare dividends. As we have seen these were largely thought to be dependent on overall
government spending remaining constant or even rising during the downturn in military
spending. In the UK, however, it is clear from government statements that there has been no
deliberate policy of using the resource dividend to boost spending in other categories of public
expenditure. As shown by Table IX, the modest reductions in British defence spending since
1984-85 are swamped by the much larger increases in other programmes, notably the health
and social security budgets. Indeed, when compared to the proceeds from privatisation, for
example, the resource dividend is relatively small in comparison. As Table X shows, between
1985-86 and 1994-95, the privatisation dividend is expected to total £67.1 billion compared to
an 'optimum' resource dividend of £29.1 billion over the same period. It is also worth noting
that, initially at least, the increases in some areas of public expenditure took place within the
constraints of declining total general government expenditure (which from 1981-82 until
1988-90 fell continuously as a percentage ofGDP). Only since the beginning of the 1990s has
the level of total general government expenditure started to rise again, due largely to the huge
increases in social security spending. But this recent growth in public expenditure also
coincides with a period in which the government has run a deficit of expenditure over tax
revenues: a budget surplus of £9 billion in 1989 had been turned into a budget deficit of
around £50 billion (or 8% ofGDP) by 1993/94. Only now is the deficit beginning to fall and is
forecast to decline to about £30 billion by 1997/98.
There is no doubt therefore that the current size of the budget deficit has been a major
contributing factor in negating the benefits of lower defence spending. The two traditional
remedies for the deficit - expenditure reductions and increased taxes - have combined to deter
reinvestment of the resource dividend. Treasury pressure for reductions in government
spending has meant that certain categories of 'regenerative' spending that might have been
expected to rise in compensation for the declining defence budget (such as trade and industry,
transport and housing), show little change or have seen their share fall. The large increases in
'rescue' programmes (largely income-related social benefits, health and law and order
budgets), and the government's antipathy for raising taxes on income, exacerbate the pressure
for reductions in these budget areas. Moreover, it is surely no coincidence that Treasury
expectations of savings in the defence budget of £750 million from 1996/97 are timed to
coincide with the next general election, when the Chancellor is expected to want every penny
he can get for tax cuts. Of course, tax increases and cuts in government expenditure are not
the only ways of reducing a budget deficit. 45 Reinvestment of the resource dividend in wealth
creating activities (the product dividend) could also reduce the deficit through increased
exports and reduced unemployment. Interestingly, however, while the Government has
refused to acknowledge the need to redirect public expenditure in mainland Britain from
defence into regenerative measures, the current opportunity for transition to a peace economy
in Northern Ireland may yet yield a different response.
In general, the economy of Northern Ireland has been public-expenditure dependent and
labour-intensive, with a large 'security industry' which is effectively reliant on the 'troubles'46
So while the peace process in the Province provides a window of opportunity, the negative
consequences of job losses in the security industry could be considerable.47 A study by the
Confederation of British Industry Northern Ireland warned:
it is essential that the overall level of public expenditure is at least maintained and that savings obtained
in reducing security related expenditure are utilised to develop an optimal level of self-sufficiency,
international levels of competitiveness and vigorous industrial and commercial activity. A range of
indicators show that Northern Ireland continues to experience a high level of deprivation, lower health
standards than in the UK as a whole, lowest average gross household income of any UK region, high
levels of poor educational achievement, and excessively high levels of unemployment..... Refocusing
public expenditure into tackling these issues will create the true 'peace dividend'.48
This potential resource dividend has two parts: the redirection of public expenditure currently
spent on Law, Order and Protective Services (LOPS) in Northern Ireland, and savings in the
overall UK defence budget from a reduction in the number of army personnel based in the
Province. In 1993/94 some £927 million (18.4% of the total Northern Ireland Block Grant)
was spent on LOPS, including £593 million on police, £145 million on prisons and £121
million in compensation. The CBI estimate that a permanent cessation of violence would lead
to a gradual reduction in the LOPS budget to around £505 million by 1998/99 and the loss of
20,000 jobs in security-related industries. If, however, the savings in public expenditure were
to be redirected back into the Northern Ireland economy, the CBI expect that this, together
with other major peace-dividend benefits (such as increased inward investment and tourism49)
would create 29,000 new jobs and 20,000 work-scheme places over the five year period.
Indeed, the process of diverting money from security services to other social and economic
programmes has already started: during the cease-fire, savings of £286 million in the security
budget were re-allocated in this way. One of the main beneficiaries has been education with
the announcement of a new £63 million programme to restore the decaying stock of schools
and colleges in the Province. 50 With the resumption of violence, however, some of this
funding is likely to be clawed back.
The military commitment in Northern Ireland in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary is a
major drain on resources. The annual gross expenditure in the defence budget attributable to
Northern Ireland is about £1.6 billion, which accounts for 12 regular infantry battalions (some
13,000 troops) and a further six battalions comprising the home service element of the locally-
recruited Royal Irish Regiment (5,400 troopS).51 Of the regular infantry battalions, six are
stationed in Northern Ireland and as many again are caught up in the 'deployment cycle'. The
'extra cost' of the army's task in Northern Ireland is thought to be about £360 million per
annum at 1994 prices, while annual local expenditure by the army is estimated at £450 million.
When both the Provisional IRA and loyalist paramilitaries announced a cessation of violence
in 1995, a reduction in overall UK troop levels in the Province became a distinct possibility.
While this has become a more distant prospect following the end of the IRA cease-fire, some
modest troop reductions have been made. 52 Any eventual major drawdown, however, will
have two significant economic consequences. First, a lasting political settlement could allow
the UK to reduce its defence spending to nearer the European average (assuming that the
troops are demobilised rather than redirected to other missions). Second, the reduction in .
troop numbers and associated incomes is likely to result in severe short-term economic
consequences for some local communities in certain towns and villages in the Province
(although these are likely to be mitigated in the longer-term by the positive benefits of the
peace dividend).
The future possibilities for a peace dividend in Northern Ireland are rather an open question,
dependent on both the outcome of the peace process, and the continued willingness of the
government to utilise any future savings in the LOPS and defence budgets to address the
structural economic problems in the Province.
The declining defence budget provides an economic opportunity. It was suggested earlier,
however, that the product dividend is dependent on how the defence savings are redeployed
and how efficiently they are put to use in the economy. Unfortunately, there has been no
attempt in the UK to use the resource dividend to address the adjustment problems being
encountered by defence contractors, defence workers and defence dependent communities.
There is no national conversion policy in the UK, despite support for such a policy among
opposition parties. 53 Instead, the Conservative Government has adopted a free-market
approach to defence restructuring, arguing that the defence industries themselves are best
placed to make their own decisions on responding to the defence downturn. 54 Support for
industry has been restricted to a series of diversification seminars run by the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI). Given Britain's present economic situation, local and regional
economic regeneration, together with the reorientation of military R&D towards civil
programmes, seem to offer the best options for improved economic performance. As the
following accounts show, however, these opportunities have not been realised.
In the absence of any central government policy, local authorities have been the focal point for
conversion activity in the UK. In the main, these have been local studies of defence
dependency and in some cases have extended to practical help fer local industries a.'ld for
retraining. Funding from EU programmes - initially through Perifra and subsequently through
Konver - have been especially important to the success of such initiatives. The UK's share of
Konver money in 1993 was just over £15 million (which was split between 160 different
awards across the UK). In comparison to the defence cuts experienced during this period, the
Konver funding can only be expected to have a minor compensatory role, particularly as
matching funding is required by local authorities and other local economic development
agencies that are already faced with considerable budgetary pressures. In a small number of
cases the Konver funding has resulted in practical initiatives to assist local economic
restructuring, but most projects could be considered as little more than traditional, reactive
local economic development around retraining and land re-use rather than longer-term
strategies involving defence-industry diversification as an explicit element of policy. 55 In the
absence of any other sources of funding Konver is obviously welcome but it does highlight the
lack of a co-ordinated national or European response to defence-industry diversification.
In most advanced. industrial nations research into dual-use technologies is becoming an .
integral part of national security and industrial policy. In the UK, however, MoD funds have
traditionally been spent solely for defence purposes (and civil funds largely for civil needs)
resulting in the separate development of defence and civil technologies. 56 This structural
separation of the government's research and development (R&D) effort between 'civil' and
'defence' projects, remains largely unchanged in the post-cold war era. Despite the
establishment of the Office of Science and Technology in 1992 (with a remit to oversee
responsibility for science and technology at a strategic, central government level) and the first
major policy review57 in this area for 20 years, the 'ring fence' around the MoD's R&D budget
remains intact.
Since the late 1960s about half of government expenditure on R&D has gone on defence, yet
the MoD continues to refuse responsibility for any broader technological or industrial policy.
The MoD, for example, is the only government department not to have adopted a specific
'Science and Technology Mission Statement', preferring instead to commit itself to a few
practical measures to enhance the amount of spin-off to (and collaboration with) the civil
sectOr.58 Similarly, the Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA) - formed in April 1991
from the four main MoD non-nuclear research establishments and expanded in April 1995 to
include the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment and other defence research,
evaluation and testing centres - has introduced a limited industrial access scheme which is
intended to help commercialise defence research. The DERA has also established its first three
dual use technology centres covering structural materials, marine technology and
supercomputing, and several other centres are under development (including superconducting,
software engineering and elect~onics). 59
The government has attempted to mitigate this lack of strategic thinking about defence R&D
with the claim that significant reductions in such spending are taking place. According to the
government's science and technology report, spending plans tor defence R&D in 1995-96 are
one fifth lower in real terms than expenditure in 1987-88, and by the turn of the century the
reduction is expected to be about one third.60 Initial indications (see Table VI) are that such
claims need to be treated with some caution. Not only is the decline in real terms fairly modest
over recent years, but no allowance is made for the fact that private industry is being asked to
take more responsibility for funding its own defence R&D.61 The growing opportunities for
'spin-in' from the civil to the defence sector, exacerbate the difficulties in obtaining an accurate
picture. There are several reasons (as outlined in Section 4) for believing, however, that total
UK (ie both public and private) spending on defence-related R&D is not being significantly
reduced, and may even increase in the coming years.62 Moreover, while government spending
on defence R&D is falling in real terms, it continues to constitute a high proportion (44.3% in
1991-92) of total government spending on R&D. This means that government funding of civil
R&D is also in decline with few signs of funds being transferred from military to civil R&D.63
That defence spending in the UK has fallen is uncontested. Though more modest than might
have been expected in the circumstances, the UK defence budget has declined as a result of
reductions in personnel levels, equipment expenditure and support services. Even allowing for
disagreement over the method of measurement, these cuts in defence expenditure have
resulted in a significant resource dividend - worth ar~:)Und£29.1 billion over the ten year
period from 1985-86 to 1994-95. Assessing whether this has been translated into a product
dividend and/or a welfare dividend is somewhat harder, however. Budgetary outcomes are a
complicated process involving several groups of decisions taken· together - expenditure
decisions are one group and taxation another - and the fungible nature of public expenditure
means that the exact destination of the resource dividend is virtually impossible to determine.
This does not prevent well-informed speculation, however. It is apparent, for example, that
the money saved from the defence budget has allowed the government to loosen some of the
financial and policy constraints within which it operates. Given the nee-liberal economic
agenda pursued during this period, it can also be assumed that one or other of two potential
welfare dividends may have been utilised. First, as government expenditure on defence began
to decline, the burden on taxation was eased thereby allowing space for cuts in personal
taxation. In this scenario the welfare dividend has almost certainly been unequally distributed
because it is largely the rich who have benefited the most from tax cuts. Second, as John
Lovering suggests, the resource dividend could effectively have been used to help underwrite
the management of recession.64 As defence spending declined, non-defence spending rose
dramatically, and so-called 'rescue' programmes (largely income-related social benefits, health
and law and order budgets) expanded the most rapidly. Thus, it could equally be asserted that
the resource dividend has been translated into a partial welfare dividend for the poorer
members of society.
If the benefits of the peace dividend largely appear to have rebounded to the more afiluent
segments of society, the costs of disarmament have also been apportioned disproportionately.
While military personnel have been granted generous redundancy, retnining and retirement
packages which have helped to soften the worst effects of dislocation, the greater hardships
have been borne by the defence industrial base, and by defence workers and defence
dependent communities in particular. Indeed, the failure to reinvest the resource dividend in
the economy to maintain aggregate demand (or to support an alternative industrial and
technology policy) has undoubtedly prevented the realisation of a product dividend.
Consequently, there is no defence conversion taking place in the UK and only minimal
diversification. This laissez-faire approach to the 'adjustment burden' together with the
centralising tendencies of government have also tended to undermine the autonomy of local
authority initiatives under the Konver Programme. Thus, defence companies are either seeking
to reduce their dependency on MoD contracts (largely through take over activity and seeking
increased arms exports as opposed to product diversification) or are increasing their degree of
specialisation in defence technologies via increased transnational co-production agreements
and mergers. The UK's industrial and technological base is continuing to contract with
thousands of skilled workers losing their jobs every month, often in regions where
unemployment is already high. This 'product deficit' is, in turn, creating resistance to further
cuts in defence expenditure.
What then of the future? Clearly, much deeper cuts in military spending are now needed if
the UK is to have any chance of realising a 'second' peace dividend. The higher percentage of
GDP spent in the UK on defence (3.3% in 1994-95, compared to the European NATO
average of 2.2%) is attributed to significant commitments - including an independent nuclear
deterrent, overseas garrisons, forces supporting the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern
Ireland and a force structure that reflects Britain's role as an island nation - not shared by most
other European NATO countries. But there is a clear rational for much larger defence cuts
within the European pillar of NATO, and within the UK in particular. Again, however, these
larger defence spending cuts will only lead to a product dividend if the money is reinvested in
'national needs' like industrial renewal, environmental restoration and renewable energies.
Without a policy of structural, lasting disarmament based on a minimal European defence
identity, and a major shift in economic and political thinking, the promised benefits from the
peace dividend are likely to remain elusive.
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